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THE refusal of the Senate to confirm the nomination of Mr. George Rublee as Federal Trade Commissioner can be fairly characterized as a deplorable and outrageous breach of trust. The nomination was not rejected because of any actual or alleged disqualification for the work. On the contrary, Mr. Rublee is probably better qualified to be Trade Commissioner than any man in the United States. As the majority of the Senators have every reason to know, he had made an exact and exhaustive study of the functions of the Trade Commission and its possible value in the American business and legal system. A properly conducted government would have scoured the country and have offered any reasonable inducement to secure the services of a man who was so exceptionally well qualified to mould the work of the Commission during its formative and experimental period. Yet the Senate refused to accept his services, and it refused frankly and exclusively because Mr. Rublee was personally obnoxious to a Senator from his own state. The reason might have been explicable, if not excusable, in case Mr. Rublee had behaved so as to furnish Mr. Gallinger any legitimate grievance. But in truth Mr. Rublee's only offense had been that of opposing in a manner less objectionable but more effective than that ordinarily used by political campaigners Mr. Gallinger's reëlection to the Senate. He was obnoxious to the Senator because he had been dangerous. As a result of its action the Senate has served notice that senatorial courtesy can be used by a Senator to keep political enemies, even of the opposite party, out of office. Mr. Rublee has only one consolation. In the eyes of the Lord more credit must attach to being personally obnoxious to Senator Gallinger than in being Trade Commissioner of the United States.

THE Conference bill will provide for a larger, better equipped and better organized army than seemed probable at the beginning of the session; but the pity of it is that the new army might easily have been made so much better than the present legislation permits. The forces in Congress making for and against an adequate and thorough plan of military preparation were more nearly balanced than in the beginning they appeared to be. As the discussion proceeded the disposition in Congress and particularly in the Senate to do a good job became stronger; but it received little or no support from the administration. President Wilson refused to use his influence in favor of any particular kind of an army. He even repudiated his Secretary of War, because that gentleman took the administration plan for a Federal militia seriously enough to propose to fight for it. Yet if Mr. Wilson had been willing to insist upon an army of a certain size and character, one adapted to the needs of American domestic and foreign policy, he might very well have obtained it. The Congressmen who wanted to do a good job only needed a little encouragement from the administration in order to put up a stiffer fight. As it was they lost out in almost every instance; and they failed at least in part because the President did not attach very much importance to the size and character of the army

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of which he is commander-in-chief. He instinctively thought of the army, as all Democrats of the old school thought of it, not as a finely tempered and dangerous instrument, which above all other instruments should be fully prepared to do its work, but as a creature of American domestic politics.

AS a consequence of his preconceptions Mr. Wilson will under the new legislation continue to command a military force determined chiefly by political rather than military considerations. The regular army will indeed be substantially increased, and if the new soldiers can be recruited, a shorter term of enlistment will result in the accumulation of a really efficient first reserve. But there are few other reasons for satisfaction. The increase in the regular army is insufficient, in part because altogether unsatisfactory provisions are made for a second reserve. It is in the organization of this "armed citizenry" that the new legislation egregiously fails. Congress is carefully bestowing on the President a body of citizen soldiers of whom he will not be the commander-in-chief, over whom his authority will under ordinary circumstances be purchased, who will have many temptations to accept national aid without conforming to national standards, and who from their very nature will always be fishing for subsidies and playing politics rather than learning to wage war. In relation to the regular army Congress betrayed some symptoms of wishing to do a good job. In relation to the militia Congress had one object already in mind—the all-important object of creating a body of citizen soldiers who, like the body of citizen pensioners, can be made into a political asset of Congressmen at the expense of the American nation.

ADVOCATES of "preparedness" who are anticipating that the work of military preparation will bring into existence a higher standard of public behavior all along the line cannot find any confirmation of their anticipation in the army legislation. Congress has postponed all the serious difficulties connected with the job of organizing an adequate and able army. It has done nothing to eliminate the extravagance and the waste which makes the existing army so unnecessarily expensive. On the contrary it has created sources of future waste, which in the course of time may become as flagrant a national scandal as are the pension appropriations. A body of professional and citizen soldiers is being provided which probably cannot be recruited, and which if recruited will be drawn chiefly from a limited number of classes. This is the most sinister aspect of the matter. Congress has been legislating on "preparedness" without any sufficient consideration of the problem of making the new army entitled to the confidence of the whole community; and in this respect Congress is merely reflecting the prevailing state of mind among the most enthusiastic unpolitical advocates of military preparation. How many of the thousands of people who participated in the "preparedness" parade in New York on May 13th noticed that the labor unionists did not join in the demonstration, and stopped to reflect on the meaning and the possible consequences of their absence? No: the military legislation of the existing Congress makes a poor beginning of a big job. It will have to be revised in the next Congress; and it will have to be revised not only for the purpose of getting a better but for the purpose of getting a more representative army. Although the legislation was determined chiefly by politics, it ignores the fundamental political considerations involved in the organization and recruiting of a large and effective army in an industrial democratic state.

IT is impossible to tell whether the current peace rumors will hasten the conclusion of the war or will merely end in mutual protestations and recriminations. The rumors seem to emanate from Berlin. This, of course, does not mean that Germany is beaten, or about to be beaten, but only that she holds this to be the opportune moment to call off the war. Germany believes that a warring nation, like an orator, should know when to stop. It should not continue fighting, even victoriously, after it has reached the point of highest relative success. That point Germany has reached, as Japan reached it after Liao Yang, and like Japan, Germany would now like to "cash in." For time is likely to run against her. Month by month the economic pressure increases. The food problem becomes more difficult, the financial situation more threatening, while victory in the west seems unattainable and in the east hardly worth while. If Germany is to conclude peace she must hurry, for what she has to offer—her conquests on all frontiers—does not increase in value, while what the Allies have to offer —peace and an end to the blockade—becomes daily more desirable.

THE very considerations which incline Germany to peace fortify her enemies in their desire to prolong the war. If Germany is now at the high point of success and is declining relatively, then, as the Allies reason, the longer peace is delayed the better. The more a nation wants peace the more it must pay, for a willingness to treat is held to be a confession of weakness. Therefore all avowals of peaceful desire are ambiguous and even minatory, and each nation, while making its advances, protests

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that it will fight to the last breath. All this talk, however, is far from being without its effect. Peace rumors are disturbing to the more pacific citizens of belligerent nations, who ask themselves what after all they are fighting for. The average Englishman is not willing to give up his life that Russia may rule at Constantinople, or Italy dominate the East Adriatic. If a peace could be obtained that would be reasonably permanent, would give justice to Belgium and Serbia and security to France, the western nations might be willing, if it were necessary, to grant Germany compensation at the expense of Russia, against whom these western nations may some day be forced to defend themselves. Naturally no such admission could be made to-day, for to desert Russia would be to split the alliance. In the end, however, some such agreement may come to pass. Germany or Austria, if it is possible, will be made to pay; otherwise, will not Russia have to pay?

SENATOR HOLLIS has established a place for himself on the roll, none too long, of constructive American legislators through his work in preparing and securing the passage in the Senate of the rural credits bill that bears his name. If the bill fails to become law, it has none the less carried us a long way toward a national handling of the rural credit problem. If it does become law we may confidently look forward to a rapid transformation of the system of loans upon farm security. The three-year loan at seven per cent, with broker's commissions on renewals, and constant risk of foreclosure, will eventually give way to the ten, twenty or thirty-year loan with flexible conditions of repayment and interest at five per cent or less. The American farmers carry an aggregate mortgage indebtedness of over four billions. The security for this huge volume of loans is unimpeachable. If interest rates average two per cent more than in other equally safe investments, this is chiefly on account of the immobility of this form of credit. The Hollis plan works toward mobility of farm loan credits. Once under way, developed and readjusted as experience dictates, it is capable of relieving the American farmer of an annual excess interest charge of eighty million dollars. It should be added that the changes made by the House in the Senate bill are all for the worse and should be eliminated in conference.

CRITICISM of the Hollis bill is abundant and varied. It is said that the farmers themselves are not interested in rural credits legislation. Perhaps this is true. Ten years ago hardly anybody in this country knew anything about the remarkable achievements of the rural credit systems of Europe. It would be too much to expect that the mass of the farming population should have become sufficiently informed on this complicated subject to become enthusiastic over any particular project. Most of the financial critics of the Hollis bill themselves betray serious gaps in their knowledge of rural credit institutions abroad. Objection is raised to the employment of government funds to launch the proposed land banks. A prominent financier points out that by the terms of the Hollis bill the government may, at the end of ten years, have invested sixty millions in the project. Well, at the end of ten years it may be saving the farmers eighty millions a year. Did the government never use its funds to promote commercial banking? Did it never employ its deposits for the relief of Wall Street? Wisely, be it admitted. But it is somewhat absurd that gentlemen who have once benefitted from government financial intervention should now be crying out so loudly against "subsidizing the farmer."

CONFIDENTIAL letters from the Ray Detective Agency and Merchants' Secret Service go broadcast over the country. The latest instance is of a letter addressed to employers in the shoe business:

> We offer you the services of the following operatives who are expert detectives and fine workmen:
>
> (a) Expert cutter and good in other parts of shop. Union man.
>
> (b) Expert laster on No. 5 machine. Non-union man.
>
> (c) All round man—best in team work on make-up. Greek. Non-union man.
>
> Any one of these can give you exact sentiment within your shop and report on efficiency and other matters, if you so desire.

What is the community to think of manufacturers who employ this sort of spying while simultaneously protesting their goodwill toward labor?

ANTHONY COMSTOCK was deservedly criticized during his lifetime for the mistakes he made in trying to censor every sex expression and sex appeal. The same sort of mistake is being made by his successor, John S. Sumner. Mr. Sumner is not satisfied to confine himself to pursuing those flagrant cases of sex exploitation which do really call for police intervention. He wants to play a much more ambitious rôle, that of censoring all adult literature and art. With due respect to Mr. Sumner's taste and intelligence, it must be realized that he is not competent to take up this office. His judgment in suppressing "Homo Sapiens," to say nothing of his tactics, closes any prospect of his being considered as a moral dictator for the United States. It is fortunate that his absurd case against *Hearst's Magazine* has col-

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lapsed. But if he does not learn from this failure, authors and artists and publishers should be ready to keep him in his proper place, whatever the cost.

Republican Debt to Roosevelt

MR. George Wickersham's recently declared preference for Justice Hughes over Elihu Root as Republican candidate for President is based on sound reasons. Whatever Mr. Root's qualifications for the office itself he is not an available candidate. As much as any other man who could be named, his candidacy would revive the controversies of 1912 and decimate the Republican vote in those central western states which are already predisposed in Mr. Wilson's favor. Justice Hughes, as Mr. Wickersham says, would have a better chance of healing the divisions in the Republican party than any other candidate. He is not implicated in the quarrel of four years ago; he has no personal responsibility for the bankruptcy of Republican leadership during the Wilson administration; he enjoys the confidence of the great majority of the Republican conservatives and progressives. The momentum in favor of his nomination would be irresistible were it not for two obstacles. He is distrusted and feared by certain of the party politicians who remember what he did as governor to the Republican organization in the state of New York. His attitude towards the immediately important issues of foreign and domestic policy are unknown and will not be known until and unless he is nominated. The first of these obstacles would scarcely count were it not for the second, but the second is important because the election of the Republican nominee is a matter quite as much of his opinions as of his personality.

The effective reunion of the Republican party does not depend merely on the nomination of a candidate who is not tainted by the quarrels and the failures of the past six years. It depends still more on the ability of any candidate who is nominated to revive the Republican tradition, to give back to the party some of its former aggressive fighting spirit and moral self-assurance. The Republicans more than the Democrats need an underlying integrity of conviction and some positive vitality of impulse. They have always been a party of action which sought to promote the national welfare, not by leaving things alone, but by using the powers and resources of the national government to carry out an economic and political program. In the coming contest they are likely to be defeated unless they regain their old ability to force the fighting and to formulate a vigorous and comprehensive national policy. The country is passing through a grave physical and moral crisis. It is confronted by dangers to which it is not accustomed and problems which elude the grasp of its older traditions. More than at any time since the Civil War the opportunity and necessity exists for courageous and far-sighted political initiative. The Republicans must supply it or become a party of negative and superseded ideas.

The need of Republican initiative is all the greater because of the course pursued by the Democrats. Under President Wilson's leadership they have reversed their party traditions and have replaced the policy of letting things alone with a policy at least of partly preparing in advance against future exigencies. The Democrats are putting in a better claim to be considered a party with a formative national policy than at any time in their history. Their policy of preparation does not, indeed, consist of anything more than a series of compromise half-measures, designed to allay a dangerous political agitation. It is as much as anything else an attempt to emasculate "preparedness" by concessions, just as so many progressive policies have been emasculated by laws which are not intended to be effectively administered. But by their course they have prevented the Republicans from appropriating any exclusive credit from a policy of preparation and they have imposed on their opponents the difficult task not merely of developing a more radical program of preparedness, but of getting into that program a lively and contagious enthusiasm for the national welfare. If the Republicans are to recover their ascendancy and to become once again the aggressive national party, it is up to them to fill the cup of American national aspiration with a larger and better contents—one which expressly associates the fulfilment of a high standard of domestic responsibility with the fulfilment of responsibilities to other countries. In no other way can they regain the moral self-assurance indispensable to a reunited and reinvigorated organization. In no other way can they fit themselves to be a desirable substitute for the Democrats instead of a more or less deplorable alternative.

Up to the present time the Republicans have utterly failed to develop the kind of leadership demanded by their own predicament and that of the country. Only one man has succeeded either in putting up an effective and significant opposition to the Democratic administration or in expressing anything of the spirit and the policy needed by an aggressively national party. That man is, of course, Theodore Roosevelt. It is a remarkable fact that the Progressive leader, around whose person the bitter controversies of 1912 chiefly centered, and whose candidacy would seem to bring with it the greatest possible provocation to discord, should also

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be the one man who has provided the Republicans with a plan for the possible restoration of party vigor and has been communicating to them the spirit with which the restoration should be infused. The value of his services to the party is so unimpeachable and emphatic that if the quarrel of 1912 had been less recent and bitter, Mr. Roosevelt could hardly fail of the nomination. Any effective Republican candidate will be obliged to take over the campaign as Mr. Roosevelt has started and blocked it out. Thus even if he cannot be nominated the necessity of his leadership for a party with the traditions of Republicanism will have been vindicated. The politicians who rejected him in 1912 are being forced to come back to him in 1916, because without the spirit and the point of view embodied and represented in him their party is bankrupt in feeling and ideas. A successful Republican candidate must not only obtain Mr. Roosevelt's support; he must in certain essential matters accept Mr. Roosevelt's lead.

No candidate can escape this condition, not even Mr. Justice Hughes. Mr. Roosevelt has anticipated the only kind of a campaign which will revive Republicanism and distinguish it from Democracy. The Democratic party under President Wilson's leadership has taken on a positive character. Just as it represented in 1912 a lukewarm and safe progressivism, so it is coming to represent in 1916 a lukewarm and safe program of national organization. If the Republicans intend, as it would be fair to infer from their record in Congress, merely to stand for another lukewarm and safe version of "peace, prosperity and preparedness," there is no sufficient reason, as the New York *World* insists, why they should not express their patriotism by joining in Mr. Wilson's renomination. The only living alternative to the spirit of Democratic policy is that embodied by Mr. Roosevelt—the spirit of adding more horsepower to the engine, of keeping your eye on the road, and of planning more carefully and more comprehensively the best route to the desired goal. The only living alternative to the Democratic policy itself is that of converting preparedness into a general and thoroughgoing program of national reorganization. The plain fact is that in the past the American nation has been prepared for nothing—neither for prosperity nor adversity, neither for doing things well nor for not doing them at all, neither for peace at home and abroad nor for war at home and abroad. If it is to be better prepared in the future, it must begin by putting into the work of preparation some of the energy and determination and some of the disposition to pay the costs of preparation which have been characteristic of Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda.

The Republican undoubtedly ought to be the party of energetic and forehanded national preparation. During its period of domination it did plan an economic and legal organization, which answered the prevailing and popular demand by accelerating enormously the production of wealth. But when it was asked to carry the job further and arrange that the wealth whose production and private appropriation had been so encouraged should be better distributed and should provide for the economic independence of the American citizens whose power to labor constituted their only asset, the Republican party faltered and divided. It looked as if an irreparable mistake had been committed when the Republican machine four years ago refused to remedy the prevailing economic and political evils and prepare to obtain for American citizens a higher general standard of living. But perhaps the mistake is not irreparable. The same goal may be reached by another road. The agitation for preparedness, military and naval, may help public opinion to understand that an efficient, wasteful, and socially callous nation cannot be prepared for fighting, because its whole organization will break down in the event of a war on the modern scale. Our American organization has actually been breaking down at the mere prospect of serious complications with a foreign country. If we are to prepare, consequently, we must prepare not merely to defend our house, but to put it in order—to put it much more completely in order than the Democrats have done or propose to do. This is the opportunity of the Republicans, as Mr. Roosevelt has so clearly pointed out. In order to seize it they do not necessarily have to nominate Mr. Roosevelt, although it is fair that they should; but if the man they do nominate fails to grasp the opportunity he will not only lose the election, but restore the Republican party as an ornamental façade rather than as an enduring structure.

The Need of a Positive Policy

HOWEVER one may approach the problem of American foreign policy and with whatever phase of it one may deal—whether the present submarine difficulty with Germany, the relations with the Allies, future sea law, an Anglo-American agreement, the Open Door—one obstinate fact persistently intrudes itself. That fact is the refusal of the American people to face squarely the necessary implications of their undoubted decision that German victory is undesirable and that they will approve no policy likely to promote it. Almost since the beginning of the war they have attempted to combine essential unneutrality with an avoidance of its necessary consequences—which need not of course include mili-

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tary coöperation with Germany's enemies. While the country realizes that it is in opinion and act unneutral in the sense that it is not at all indifferent as to the outcome of the war and intends in no way to lose sight of its partiality in its policy, there is no general realization of the political implications of its decision; of the extent to which the government, in the attempt to be guided by that decision and yet to maintain a diplomatic, legalistic and technical neutrality, is paralyzed in its defense of American and neutral right. Still less is there any realization that the prolongation of this equivocal attitude may cause the national resources of America in the future to become an immense premium upon international anarchy and disorder. The fact of real unneutrality as distinct from the diplomatic fiction, American public opinion sufficiently realizes. What it does not understand is the actual relation of that fact to the country's foreign problems.

Let us see first how it has affected the conduct of the submarine affair.

As early as February, 1915, Germany said in effect that her submarine policy was in reprisal for the English violation of sea law as embodied in the Declaration of London, and that if America would secure from England the observance of that code Germany would abandon her submarine warfare against merchantmen. Now the Declaration of London corresponded broadly to the conception of sea law for which America has always stood. She had, as Professor Clapp and others have pointed out, an instrument ready to her hand—an embargo on munitions, justified by the clause of the 1907 Hague Convention which allows a change of rules as to the export of munitions during a war "in cases where experience shows the necessity of such action in order to safeguard the nation's rights"—for compelling English observance of the Declaration. Had America taken the course of threatening the use of that instrument she would have protected her rights not only as against Germany but as against England. She could have secured, as Professor Clapp points out, a great victory for neutral right, "recovered and established for all time."

And this, if America had been really indifferent as to which side won, is just the course that she would have taken. She did not take it because American public opinion would not have sanctioned a course of action that made for German victory. Once let the American people see that their action is leading in that direction and they would also see that to protect temporary trade rights at the cost of British defeat would be to sacrifice the lesser to the greater. Such was the real reason why proposals like that of Professor Clapp were not adopted.

But the American government in its dealing with Germany was unable to avow the truth. If it had been able to disregard technical neutrality it would have said to Germany: "We are unable to take decisive action against England for the maintenance of the Declaration of London because to do so would be to aid your cause. And we fear that. We fear that its success might be a menace to us. While England's methods threaten neutral trade, yours threaten neutral existence, and we cannot act as though those things were of equal import to us and the world. Give us some assurance that your ultimate international policy does not involve menace and unrest; define, that is, the terms upon which you would be prepared to make peace and live your life in the community of nations in the future; and then, if those terms satisfy us that your cause is at bottom no more aggressive than that of the Allies, we shall return to real neutrality; we shall be in a position to enforce the Declaration of London, to resume normal relations with you, to withdraw our hostility."

But the old political fiction of neutrality has made that impossible. The submarine issue has not been settled, and until we get a more cohesive international order we can never know whether it has been settled or not, either in this or in future wars. America's international position remains at the mercy of accident—the nerves of a frightened or drunken submarine commander who, just at a moment when other issues embitter the situation, sinks an American ship and drowns a hundred or a thousand people. The psychological need for action would cause popular support to go to "the party of action"—bad action, railroading the country into war of unlimited liability and indefinite association with the varying territorial and political ambitions of the Allies.

And when the diplomatic fiction has been completed we get—what? A promise that it won't occur again. If we can hope that the demonstration of America's readiness to fight "at the drop of the hat," a readiness backed it may be in the future by a great American navy, will deter a hard-pressed combatant from using these methods of warfare, how comes it that the very belligerent now in question is unrestrained by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Is the American navy of the future to be successful where these have failed? In the meantime the American failure to take effective action with reference to the maintenance of the Declaration of London involves temporarily at least the sacrifice of rights which America has always in the past been ready to defend at the cost of war. American power stands effectively for neither the life nor property of non-combatants in war, for neither neutral right nor neutral existence.

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But the story does not end there. Official neutrality compels the American government to imply to Germany that the American government would be ready to sanction the sale of munitions to Germany if she could come and fetch them. This obvious falsehood deprives the just decision of the American people against Germany of any value as a deterrent of future aggression. After this war the Germans will say—and they will say it on the strength of the position now maintained by the American government—"If we could have commanded the sea we could have transferred the economic alliance of America from our enemies to ourselves. The important thing in the future therefore is not to be concerned about respecting international obligations like the Belgian treaty, but to command the sea. If you can do that the national resources of America are at your disposal whether your cause be good or bad, aggressive or defensive. We have the assurance of the American government on that point." The vast national resources of America are to act not as a silent pressure on the side of the good behavior of nations and the respect of treaty right, but on the side of naval rivalry irrespective of right or treaty obligation or the general interest of nations.

To be sure, it will always be open to America to refuse to supply a country in the position of Germany even if it did command the sea. But so long as the prospective combatants *do not know beforehand* what in America's view will constitute good or bad behavior, what she will regard as aggressive and menacing and what defensive, they will always assume that the chances are on the side of their being able to buy the munitions and supplies if they can fetch them. A nation's policy always looks defensive or defensible to itself. No people is able to make a very accurate estimate of foreign opinion of its own conduct. Seventy million Germans, including men of great intellectual equipment, are still marvelling because the world cannot see they are fighting a purely defensive war forced upon them by the unprovoked aggression of jealous and truculent neighbors. Unless there is some definite and unmistakable criterion of what constitutes an unjustifiable war, they or others will always count upon being able, once they command the sea, to command also that economic alliance of neutrals that at present goes with it.

Suppose that twenty years ago America, desiring to attach to international law some great interest which would tend to make its observance obviously to the interests of the nations, had said: "Any nation proceeding to hostilities against another without first having submitted its difference at least to inquiry, or any nation invading a neutralized state, or any nation failing to put into operation in its protectorates the principle of the Open Door, will not be able to secure American supplies, munitions or credit for the purposes of its war, whether it obtains command of the sea or not."

If we could imagine such a policy adopted even by the United States alone, every prospective belligerent would desire to observe the rule and to put itself right with America by so doing, whether it expected to command the sea or not. If it expected to command the sea it would observe the rule in order to take full advantage of its power, and secure the economic alliance of America to its cause; and if it did not expect to command the sea, it would equally desire to observe the rule in order to deprive its enemy of most of the advantages of such command; in other words, to have America do what the Germans so keenly desire her now to do: embargo the export of supplies and munitions. Thus, to all belligerents—prospective commanders of the sea or not—would there be the strong motive to observe the rules laid down; a behavior which would prevent most wars and give international organization and machinery a chance. There would be set up a strong tendency to international arrangement; it would have behind it the push of a great material advantage: America's economic alliance, and its refusal to the enemy. Respect for the rights of others, and of some means of determining those rights, would for the first time in history be a definite and visible military asset. America's enormous resources would then be acting as a silent and potential power for international order.

A Government Plea for Health Insurance

WHEN historians of the future come to examine the origins of the movement for social advance that gives the present its distinction, they doubtless will be impressed by the antithetical impulses that generated our enthusiasm for reform. They will find the passion of the humanitarian yoked with the zeal of the scientist; the sentimentalist and the rationalist fighting side by side against the established order. Rebellion born of pity joins hands with rebellion born of exact knowledge and clear analysis. It matters little that one sees the enemy as injustice and suffering, the other as stupidity and waste. Pseudo-science may bring down on its head the imprecations of the humanitarian; scientists may curse the "insane fringe" of the army of sentiment. But the two forces work together.

Just now the doctors are on the offensive against the present economic and industrial régime. Sur-

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geon General Gorgas of the army has almost a set speech on the relations between wages and the public health. On many occasions within the year his account of the part played by increased pay in cleaning up the Canal Zone has impressed audiences and newspaper readers. Now comes the United States Public Health Service with a bulletin on health insurance by two of its staff—Dr. B. S. Warren, surgeon, and Mr. Edgar Sydenstricker, statistician. Their report covers a long investigation begun in coöperation with the Commission on Industrial Relations. Incidentally, the almost complete silence that followed the issuing of this report affords another instance of the need of expert publicity if valuable government investigations are to show better results than the encumbering of shelves.

Not less important than the outlines of a plan for state and federal systems of compulsory insurance for wage earners is the impressive array of statistical information here gathered to show the deterioration wrought by industrialism in the bodies of the wage-workers. To read the twenty-eight pages into which the authors have compressed the gist of all knowledge available regarding the health of wage-workers in this country is to come to a staggering realization of the stupid and amazing atrocity of which our industrial régime is at present guilty.

No effort is made to estimate the number of preventable deaths among wage-earners. But in the twenty-eight pages devoted to a discussion of conditions causing sickness, there is a multiplication of specific instances telling more forcefully than could any eloquent summary of the heavy day-by-day toll of life and health taken by conditions that are inherent in our industry and not to be controlled by the individual.

It is in its insistence upon the economic factor that we find something almost revolutionary in this bulletin issued by men who are supposedly strangers to social reform and that passion for making over the world which Art Young calls the "cosmic hunch." There are striking paragraphs all through the discussion of inadequate diet, housing conditions, community environment, women in industry, over-crowding, and infant mortality. "It is clearly evident," we are told, "that the tendency during the period 1900-1913 has been toward an impoverishment of the diet of families with low incomes." Eight hundred dollars is the least an average family can properly subsist on, and less than one-half the families of wage-workers in the principal manufacturing and mining industries have been found to have family incomes of that amount, while nearly one-third have incomes of less than $500. And in conclusion there is the plain statement that "from the foregoing it is evident that underlying all other economic factors affecting the wage-earners' health is the fact of poverty. The wage and income investigations seem to indicate that fully one-half of the people employed in the principal manufacturing and mining industries have not been able in recent years to earn an income sufficient to maintain a healthful standard of living." The array of damaging facts is here used to introduce health insurance as a substantial remedy, but in admitting its validity the reader surely must be impressed with the need of more radical readjustments.

From a discussion of causes, Dr. Warren and Mr. Sydenstricker pass to an assessment of responsibility. They suggest the cost of an adequate system of prevention and relief as 50 cents a week for each insured person, of which the employee is to contribute 25 cents, the employer 20 cents, and the public 5 cents. Protest against this division will come from the superficial radical, who, in his animus against the employer, wishes him to pay the whole bill. This would sanction and perpetuate insufficient wages by assuming that they always will be paid, and permitting the employer to plead that he is meeting the cost of the havoc they cause.

So far as they are able, wage-workers are rapidly adopting health insurance of their own accord. Dr. Warren and Mr. Sydenstricker point out the high cost of privately administered insurance, the undemocratic and sometimes unfair character of systems instituted by the large employing corporations, and the failure of trade and labor unions to initiate insurance schemes on any adequate scale. Only a small portion of wage-workers are now insured, and there is no likelihood that the more poorly paid workmen who stand most in need of insurance will obtain it in time to prevent a deterioration that society cannot permit.

"The great mass of low-paid, unskilled workers," we are told, "are seldom found among those insured in union, establishment, mutual society and commercial insurance company funds. It is not going too far to say that the situation in the United States at present is not nearly so good as the situation in Great Britain prior to the passage of the National Insurance act."

Compulsory health insurance administered by the Government is nearly as old as the nation. "As early as July 16th, 1798, Congress enacted a law taxing all vessels of the United States merchant marine 20 cents per month for every person employed on board and providing for authority for deducting this amount from the wages of such persons. This fund was appropriated for the relief of sick and disabled seamen and constituted the marine hospital fund. In 1884 the capitation tax was re-

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pealed, and a tonnage duty was imposed on shipping."

Dr. Warren and Mr. Sydenstricker do not undertake to present here a detailed plan for federal and state health insurance. They content themselves with a convincing exposition of its need, and with pointing out some of the considerations that must govern the authors of an effectual law. Heaviest emphasis is laid on the paramount importance of so administering any scheme of insurance that all agencies shall be brought into coöperation to prevent disease, not merely to relieve its victims. The failure to provide such coöperation is the most serious defect of specific plans thus far offered to American legislatures.

The health-insurance system can be linked with the health-promoting agencies, we are assured, by providing an efficient staff of medical officers detailed from the federal or state health departments, but subject to the regulations issued by the insurance commission; by providing a fair and sufficient incentive for active assistance by the medical profession; and by providing for a close coöperation of the health-insurance system with state, municipal and rural health departments and boards. The medical staff would act as referees to prevent malingering and would certify the payment of all benefits. With such a check, freedom could be allowed the insured to call in his family physician. It is not necessary to point out the possibilities of disease prevention which may be expected from the visits into the home by a skilled sanitarian in addition to the attention of the family physician. The report adds: "The freedom of choice of physicians on the part of insured persons and the payment of the physicians on a capitation basis regardless of whether their patients are sick or well, should offer every incentive to physicians to keep their patients well and to endeavor to please by rendering their most efficient service. The wage earner would seek the advice of his family physician earlier and oftener in case of all ailments, and thus aid the physician in preventing serious diseases."

The special value of this discussion is the understanding shown by the authors of the peculiar problems to be met in applying such a system to a people that resents any governmental interference with the personal life of the individual. The recommendation that insured persons be permitted to call in their family physicians is an instance. After full investigation the authors are confident that this freedom is not incompatible with an efficient and economical administration. They have caught the psychology of those representatives of labor who look with suspicion on governmental welfare work. Those who have nothing but impatience for this suspicion do not realize the real danger to democratic ideals that lies in the numbers and energy of those who frankly do not believe in democracy, who believe instead in regimentation and discipline for the wage-earners.

There are indications that organized labor will not much longer persist in stolid opposition to the assumption by government of such services as the insurance of the people against sickness. President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor has reached a sort of compromise with the Socialists, as represented in Congress by Mr. Meyer London, on a bill calling for the appointment of a commission to study the subject of sickness and unemployment insurance, and report within a year. Mr. Gompers contented himself with an amendment to the original resolution specifically directing that the investigation include the possibility of meeting the need of insurance through voluntary organizations of wage-earners. Mr. Gompers himself opposes government-administered insurance. But there is a large and growing number of trade-union leaders who do not share his fear that such service will weaken the morale of the workers and prevent their enlistment in the struggle for industrial democracy. Mr. Gompers's opposition could be more easily justified if the field would otherwise be left free to the labor unions. But already many great employing corporations have resorted to compulsory sickness insurance schemes partly for the purpose of binding their employees to them and thus strengthening their position against the unions. As between the fraternal good offices of government and the paternal and feudalistic welfare schemes of a private corporation, organized labor's choice, it seems, should be clear. Under government insurance, the wage-earner carries its benefits with him from job to job. To-day tens of thousands of wage-earners receive less substantial benefits in the form of a special privilege that can be withdrawn at any time by the employer.

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America's Traditional Isolation

EUROPEANS are frequently asked by their American friends what they as impartial observers think of the position towards the Old World into which the United States has been brought by the events of the last half century, and in particular how far the United States can now be guided by the counsels which Washington gave in his farewell address, counsels recommending a policy of complete detachment from and non-intervention in the political affairs of Europe. This question has so often been addressed to me as having lived for some time in America and studied American history that I have been led to put together in a very brief form some of the considerations which seem to bear upon it. They are the fruits of a reflection which began long before the outbreak of the present war and they are written down, it need hardly be said, with no intent to express an opinion on the course the United States ought to follow in any particular conjuncture, but only to suggest some general principles which would, supposing them to be sound, be applicable irrespective of any such particular conjuncture.

Washington's Address was recognized in his own time, and has been recognized ever since, as a masterly document. No single utterance by any American statesman has had more influence, perhaps none has had so much influence, upon the mind of the American people. The advice it contained was wise advice, eminently suitable to the moment and for long afterwards. It was followed by his earlier successors to the great benefit of the young republic; it was the parent or foreshadowing of that declaration of policy in which John Quincy Adams and the English George Canning agreed, and which was delivered by President Monroe. It outlined a course of action which the United States could then safely follow and which, one may say, was prescribed both by its circumstances and by the circumstances of contemporary Europe.

Consider what those circumstances were. In Washington's day North America was distant from Europe by a voyage of some weeks, often of many weeks, and often perilous. American commerce with Europe was already important, but how small compared with that of our times! Very few persons went to and fro. News came slowly and what did come became imperfectly known to the American people. They could afford to think little and care little about Europe, not only because their relations, personal and commercial, were comparatively slender but also because they were then and for two generations afterwards mainly occupied in colonizing their vast western territory and developing their own resources. They were moreover in Washington's day a population of only five millions.

And what were the circumstances of Europe from Washington's day until the middle of the last century? The great Powers of the European continent were involved in a conflict of dynastic interests in which all the Powers showed themselves equally selfish and equally hostile to the principles of liberty. They had little to do with the United States except for that short period in which the Holy Alliance threatened an interference with the efforts for independence of the Spanish American colonies, an interference averted by the efforts of the United States and of Great Britain. The United States could well think in those days that it had little to do with European complications, and the less to do the better.

But at last things changed in Europe and the revolutions of 1848 marked a decisive stage in the change. They have gone on changing fast since then, and the greatest change of all has been the extension of the power and influence of the leading civilized states beyond the boundaries of Europe; the whole world has now become one by the enormous development of trade, due to new and swift means of transportation and communication, and by the interests which every country has in the weal or woe of every other country. Not only the directly commercial, but the financial relations of all civilized countries are closely interwoven; wars affect the trade and the welfare generally of neutrals more than ever before; capital has become so great a power, and capital in one country is so interlocked with capital in another, that whatever affects it anywhere affects it everywhere. No country escapes this influence and the United States can escape it as little as any because it is the wealthiest of all.

Moreover, the range of offensive warlike action has been immensely enlarged; every state has now become the neighbor of every other for evil as well as for good. Were an aggressive and ambitious military and naval Power, restrained by no scruples, disposed to embark on a policy of conquest overseas at the expense of weaker nations, she could do now what would have been impossible in the days of Washington. We in England used till lately to set down as mere " pipe dreams " the fears that such an aggressive European Power would threaten such countries as Brazil or Argentina, but we must

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now confess ourselves mistaken. Neither of those countries nor the islands of the West Indies would be safe from attack were the other Powers which possess navies, and would be interested in checking aggression, unable to intervene. Supposing their navies got out of the way, the field would be clear.

Thirdly, European wars have now almost lost their old dynastic character. Austria is an exception, for there the Hapsburgs are still allowed to play their own hand, but the Austro-Hungarian monarchy—an ill-assorted congeries of races, only one of which is attached to the dynasty and some of which dislike it—is an anachronism in the modern world. Wars are now undertaken partly for colonies and commerce, but mainly for the sake of nationality and liberty. This war has arisen from a quarrel over nationality, but it involves the principle of liberty also, because everyone knows that if Germany had been a free country in the sense in which France and Italy, Switzerland and Holland are free, there need have been no conflict. The course which the war has taken has involved not only the principle of liberty but the maintenance of international right, the observance of rules laid down by international conventions, and the principles of humanity towards non-combatants, and these principles interest all the world, the two Americas no whit less than Europe. They, too, have a stake in the struggle.

Fourthly, never before has the power of public opinion in neutral nations been so fully recognized as it is in this war. Each of the belligerents has shown itself anxious to win the favor of that opinion, recognizing its moral influence as well as the possibilities of its direct action. Thoughtful men in every neutral nation feel that the results of the war must affect for good or evil their own moral standard and their own political development. This is a proof of how near to one another are the old and the new world of to-day.

Lastly, there is another way in which the position of the United States has been entirely changed. She now numbers more than twenty times the population of Washington's day. She has become a great Power to which the world looks as the strongest and most impartial exponent of neutral opinion. The United States stands in an especial degree for the principles of international justice and international law. It has done more than any other nation to advocate the substitution of arbitration for war, and to improve the rules and assert the value of the principles of public law as governing international relations. Less than ever before can the United States view with an indifferent eye the conflict, wherever in the world it may be waged, for principles which it has done so much to promote, principles intertwined with its own life and growth. Its greatness and its history alike impose on it a unique responsibility. Were Washington alive now would he not recognize such a responsibility? He certainly could no longer say in the words of his message, "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation." This brings me back to the point where we started. Have not the changes of one hundred and twenty years so altered the relations of North America to Europe as to make some lines of action right or even necessary now which would have been uncalled for, and even dangerous, in 1796? These are submitted as general considerations. Of their applicability to the present or any other specific crisis it is not for me to speak. No sensible man on this side of the Atlantic would venture to offer argument or advice upon matters which are entirely for the judgment of the government and people of the United States. The more anyone knows of the conditions under which the Executive and Congress have to act, and the complicated facts they have to weigh, the less would he presume to offer advice.

But there is one point on which a word may be said, because it relates not to the present conjuncture or to that treaty settlement when the war ends which the belligerent Powers, whoever they may then be, will have to make, but to the further and subsequent question: what is to be done after the settlement has been reached and completed? This is a matter on which Europeans are entitled to address their American friends, inviting their cooperation in a work to be done hereafter for the benefit of the world. All thoughtful men both in Britain, and, as we are told, in the United States, also feel that some effort must be made to provide machinery calculated to prevent the recurrence of such a frightful calamity as this war has proved to be. The difficulties of such a scheme are obvious. But they need not be insuperable, with the coöperation of the United States, which would bring to any concerted plan for the amicable settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of peace by a League to restrain aggression, its authority, its strength, and that disinterestedness which belongs to its position outside the circle of European jealousies. Here is an undertaking which the changes of the last seventy years have made a matter of common concern to every part of the world. No great nation, whatever its maxims of policy have heretofore been, can, if it approves the end in view, stand aloof from the effort to attain that end, now more than ever urgent. Here is a service in which the United States is called upon to join because it is to be rendered to mankind at large, to the New World as well as to the Old.

JAMES BRYCE.

London, May.

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The Future of Mr. Lloyd George

IT is strange that the Catholic Church, casting about for forms of penance, never thought of using the portrait painter's art. An order of painting friars, whose skill could reveal the mind in the face, would have exerted a terrible power upon a sensitive penitent. Conceive a closet hung with sketches taken in youth, in middle life and in old age by the same merciless hand, in which would stand revealed the soul's wear under the friction of time.

The most brilliant and the most pitiless of English draftsmen painted the other day for the Red Cross a portrait of Mr. Lloyd George. The foible of Mr. Augustus John is not veneration, and in this vivid but cruel work the man is drawn as few of us venture to see him. One rarely sees a face quite as it is. Memory brings its colorings, and man's record shapes insensibly for us the expression of his features. The clearest memory that exists for me of Mr. Lloyd George is of the man as he was some sixteen years ago, mid-way in the Boer War. The face was younger and smoother and less scarred by the world. It wore a daring look of challenge, and the eyes had still something of the poet's vision, who sees a distant horizon. In those days, with no thought of self and no anxious heed for his career, he braved a nation at war, and with an eloquence that counted no consequences, denounced the greedy and oppressive policy which was erasing from the list of free peoples the names of two little republics. It is another man whom Mr. John has seen. The world has built its walls about him. The vision of distant things and high ideals is gone from the eyes. The features have lost that suggestion of spiritual beauty. It is the face of a politician, busied in the chancy pursuit of success, absorbed in the struggle with other wills, and bent by its habitual thoughts into a look that has more in it of calculation than of chivalrous defiance. It makes above all an impression of restlessness. It is uneasy, insecure, alert, the face of a man who is for ever scheming, who gambles with his own career and stakes his all upon success. The lifted brow is watching for some stealthy movement of an opponent, and the lips, twisting the gray moustache, hold back the nervous impulse to an instant retort. The idealist and knight-errant of sixteen years ago has become the engineer of political crises, the artist of coalition, the blender of parties and opinions, the opportunist, the manipulator.

Whatever the future of Mr. Lloyd George may be, he will remain a Celt. His originality, his success and also his failure, come back to this, that he brings into English affairs a temperament provokingly alien, in its daring and in its grace. He is never quite like anyone else, and in any party he wears its colors with a difference. When English Liberals fought the Boer War, they used to speak more in sorrow than in anger, heavily, with a lament for the evil times. His rage was quick, inspiring, impenitent, and when he struck, his lithe frame danced with the joy of battle. Other men fought the House of Lords, and even Mr. Asquith hurled ponderous phrases at them. But who else enjoyed fighting them? He was an artist in his vituperation, and his phrases were not so much missiles hurled at an enemy as postures in which he revealed himself with delight.

There is an English tradition in oratory, based on classical models, and redolent of Latin prose. You still may hear it, though rarely in this generation, in the more studied utterances of Mr. Asquith in his Ciceronian vein, or of Mr. Churchill, when he recollects his ancient descent. To that style Mr. Lloyd George makes no pretensions. His form is simple, colloquial, familiar. But he plays on a chord of sentiment which the English orator, trained in a public school with its red-Indian tradition of a speechless reserve, is ashamed to touch. The same speech will sink into sheer vulgarity, and then rise to a pure note of poetry, a ringing appeal to sentiment which reveals the Welsh bard beneath the British politician.

In his handling of men and movements the secret of the man is an un-English grace and charm. There is no group or section but has at some period accused him of betrayal. There is none which he has not on occasion disappointed and misled. They behaved, with the single exception of the suffragists, as though the process were rather agreeable than otherwise. I have often watched Greeks manipulating Turkish governors and soldiers with a like skill, and I came to the conclusion that provided a Greek could keep a Turk flattered and amused, he did not mind being " done." This art is rarely developed by ruling races, and in this as in so much else, Mr. George is the Celt. The ruling race perceives the obliquity, but it enjoys the exhibition of grace.

A man of this mercurial temperament without systematic training or discipline, no reader, no student, avid of immediate success, alive in every nerve and living in the movement, impulsive, intensely personal and undisguisedly vain, will be guided in his political career by the two arts of which he is the master. By them he must succeed. He will choose his opinions as a prima donna chooses her rôles. Some suit his style and others do not. The orator must speak to the masses, and lead a popular party, for he speaks the mother-tongue of the democracy.

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That is at once his endowment and his limitation. If he had this gift alone, he would remain to the end of his days a leader of revolts and a champion of proletarian causes, more often in opposition than in power. The other art conflicts with the orator's endowment. He has the instinct for compromises. He is always on the lookout for what he calls in familiar speech "a deal." An opponent is always for him a man with whom he may one day form a combination.

His mind moves the more readily on these lines, because in politics he is essentially a realist. The traditions of old-world Liberalism have always sat lightly on him. His mind is not at home among doctrines and principles. He lives by his eyes, perceiving sharply and feeling easily where others reason stubbornly. Welshman though he is, he cares little for the dreary negative radicalism of the Disestablishment movement. He has done little or nothing for Irish home rule, and Irish nationalists distrust him. He is in private a heretic on free trade, and is destined in all likelihood to destroy it. He cares nothing for the cherished Liberal tradition of voluntary service, and would as readily set up conscription for the industrial as for the military services of war. Liberalism is not for him a body of doctrines. It is at most an emotional key. It is the state of mind which lies behind effective speeches about the claims of the democracy and the interests of the poor. Progressive it may be and constructive, but it would find its allies rather more naturally among the Tory democrats of the younger school, than among the stiff trade-union leaders with their ingrained attachment to formulae, and the radicals who count their descent from the Manchester school.

The orator will always choose a policy which can be expounded in effective speeches to popular audiences. But the engineer of compromises will find a certain aesthetic pleasure in bringing incompatible elements together, and forming in the chaos of contemporary English politics new combinations and unexpected coalitions. The restlessness of the man gives him, in spite of old hostilities, more real affinity to such a personality as Lord Northcliffe, mobile, enterprising and adaptable, than to the respectable inertia of Mr. Asquith.

Only a rash prophet would dare to cast the horoscope of such a man. He will have made at least three fresh crises in the Cabinet—if it survives—before these pages have crossed the Atlantic. One can, however, see the lines on which he is moving. He is following in the steps of our last great demagogue, Joseph Chamberlain, who also turned midway in an ambitious career from radicalism to imperialism. He will take over the standard of aggressive imperialism. He will drop the fetters of radical tradition in such matters as conscription and free trade. He will aspire to lead a "national" party, equally divorced from the old Toryism of class privilege, and the old Liberalism of difficult principles. He lacks indeed the robust English brutality of Mr. Chamberlain. He will retain something of the sentiment of the school in which he grew up. He will not turn crudely from his old pacifism to a doctrine of force and revenge, for pacifism makes an effective note in oratory, but he has learned that the wider success must be won by an appeal to the simpler passions of imperial self-consciousness. He will embark on the new venture with the resolve to say much and to do something for the cause of the poor and for constructive social reform. That also was Mr. Chamberlain's intention. In the event he will probably learn that the support of such forces as are represented by the *Times* and the *Daily Mail* must be paid for. The classes which will help him to establish conscription and to destroy free trade will not applaud further essays in the super-taxation of unearned wealth, or fresh campaigns against the landed interest.

I question whether we shall ever see him in the place which his ambition assigns to him, as a Premier at the head of a national party. English prejudices demand a more stable, a less mercurial leadership. The public-school tradition is merciless, moreover, to a man who affects an easy attitude towards the conventional loyalties and decorums. His fate, I suspect, is to be rather the brain and the tongue than the titular president of some new coalition. By what process of disruption the new group will crystallize is still obscure. The risk at present is that Mr. Lloyd George's silent work of intrigue behind the scenes may lose him the following which is his asset. At present his alliance with Lord Northcliffe, his manoeuvers against Mr. Asquith, and the whispers of his infidelity to cherished Liberal principles, have shaken his position, while for lack of oratorical opportunity he has made no new converts. His power will be manifest only when he has made some three or four speeches in the new direction. It is a real power, and it will survive while he can shape a peroration.

The inner world of politics shakes its head during these intervals of silence. It knows too much of the tactician's manoeuvers. It remembers too much about those various causes which he "torpedoed" when they inconvenienced his career, as he "torpedoed" the suffrage bill. It detects the ambition. It doubts the power of self-control. It resents the restlessness, the slyness, the half-truths, and in moments of irritation it even rebels against the charm. It will admit the power only when the orator returns with the plaudits of the multitude behind him. A multitude he can still find. It will

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not be organized labor, resentful of conscription and distrustful of every form of organized state action. It will not be radical nonconformity, profoundly rooted in the historic Liberal past. It will be a wider, more fluid audience, less thoughtful, less prejudiced, less critical. The lobbies of Westminster will register its cheers, count its votes, and measure the man by the echo. On that arithmetic turns the future of the Coalition and the destiny of Mr. Lloyd George.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

London, May.

Fifth Ave. and 42nd St.

I

"THOUGH you do not know it, I have a soul. Behold, across the way, my library. When the night shrouds those lions and the fresh young trees shake out their greenery against the white stonework, do you not catch a suggestion of atmosphere, something of a mood? And the black cliffs around, with the janitress lights making jewelled bars the width of them, are they not monuments? I cleave brilliantly, up and down this dormant city. It is for you, late wayfarer. Pay no heed to the plodding milk-wagon or the hatless young maiden speeding her lover's motor. Heed my long silences, my tall darknesses. My human tide has ebbed. My buildings come about me to muse and to commune. Receive, for once on Fifth Avenue, the soul that is imprisoned in my stone and steel."

It is not for the respectable, this polite communication. Theater and club and restaurant have long since disgorged these. New York has masticated their money. They have done as they should and are restored uptown. Even the old news-woman, she who had spent starving months in the Russian woods, caught in the first eddies of the war, she has tottered from her stand down by the station. The Hungarian waiter in Childs' is still there, still assuaging the deep nocturnal need for buckwheat cakes, but that is off the avenue. It is three, the avenue is nearly empty. It is ready to disclose its soul.

But before this subtle performance there is a preliminary. It is a very self-respecting avenue and at three on a pleasant morning, when no one is around to disturb it, it proceeds to take its bath. Perhaps a few motors go by—a taxi rolling north, heavy with night thoughts, a tired white face framed in its black depth; or a Wanamaker truck clanking loosely home in the other direction, delivered of its suburban chores. The Italian acolytes are impartial. They spray the wheels of a touring car with gusto, ignored by its linked lovers, or drive a powerful stream under the hubs of a Nassau News wagon trundling to a train. The avenue must be refreshed, the brave green of the library trees nodding approval, the sparrows expecting it. It must be prepared for the sun, under bold lamps and timid stars.

A fine young morning, the watchman promises. A bit of wind whiffles the water that is shot out from the white-wing's hose, but it is clearing up above and looks well for the day. The hour beckons memories for the watchman—fine young mornings he used to have long ago, in Ireland, a boy on his first adventure and he driving with the barley to Ross.

It is an empty street. The hose is wheeled away over the glistening asphalt. The watchman disappears—he has a cosy nook beyond the ken of time-clocks. The last human pygmy seeks his pillow, to hide a diminished head. With man accounted for, night sighs its completion and creeps to the west. Then, untrammelled of heaven or minion, the buildings have their moment. Each tower stretches his proud height to the morning. The stones give out their spirit, their music is unsealed.

II

Fifth Avenue stands serene and still, but not forever can it hold the virgin morning. Its windows may be blank, its sidewalks vacant. Behind the walls there is a magnet drawing back its human life.

"Give us this day our daily bread." A saintly venerable horse seems to know the injunction. Emerging from nowhere, ambling to nowhere, it usurps the innocent morning in answer to the Lord.

And not by bread alone. There is nothing in the prayer about clams, but someone in Mount Vernon is destined to have them quickly. Out of the mysterious south, racing against time, a little motor flits onward with gaping barrels of clams. At a decent interval comes a heavier load of fish. Great express wagons follow, commissarial giants. The honest uses of Fifth Avenue begin.

Butchers and bakers are out before fine ladies. The grocer and the greengrocer are early on their rounds. But an empty American News truck confesses that eternal vigilance is the price of circulation. Its gait is swifter than the gait of milkman or fruit-and-vegetable man. Dust and dew are on the florist's wheels, he has come whistling by the swamps of Flushing. His flimsy automobile runs lightly past the juggernauts that crush down.

Uncle Sam is in haste at six in the morning. His trucks hurl from Grand Central to make the substations. But his is not the pride of place. Nor is it coal or farmers' feed that appropriates the

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middle of the street. The noblest wagons, a long parade of them, announce the greater glory of beer. The temperance advocate may shudder at the desecration of the morning. He may observe "Hell Gate Brewery" and nod his sickly nod. But there is something about this large preparedness for thirst that stills the carping worm of conscience. It is good to see what solid, ample caravans are required to replenish man with beer. It is not the single glass that is glorious. It is not even the single car-load. It is the steady, deliberate, ponderous procession that streams through the early hours. Once it seemed as if Percherons alone were worthy of beer-wagons. It satisfied the faith that there was Design in creation, but the Percheron is not needed. There is the same institutional impressiveness about a motor-truck piled to the sky with beer.

III

"Number, please?" She is anonymous, that inquirer. But behind her anonymity there is humanity. Fifth Avenue and 42nd St. caught a glimpse of her at 6.45 A. M.

She was up at 5 in the morning. She had a pang as she put on her check suit, slightly darker than her check coat lined with pink. Her little hat, however, was smart and new. Her mother cooked breakfast while she set the table. Then she walked to the Third Avenue "L" with her friend. They got off the express at 42nd St., rode to Fourth Avenue on the short spur line, and walked along 42nd St. in time for them to do a brief window-shopping as they passed the shirt-waists at Forsythe's. Her friend's bronze shoes she envied as they crossed the little park back of the library. On Sixth Avenue they inspected the window at Bernstein's. A slight argument engrossed them. They hovered over the window, chirping not unlike the sparrows in Bryant Park. Then, in a flurry of punctuality, they raced for the telephone company to begin their "Number, please."

An hour earlier laborers with dinner-pails had crossed Fifth Avenue, and hatless Polish girls on their way to scrub. By seven o'clock the Negro porters and laborers were giving way to American strap-hangers on the elevateds and in the subway. It was getting to be the hour of salesmen and sales-girls and office-boys and shop-subordinates and clerks. The girls back of the scenes at the milliner's, they go up Fifth Avenue at seven, to take one side-street or another. The girl who sells you a toothbrush in the drug-store hurries by the shop windows, herself as neat as a model. Is it early? Myriads of men are pouring down already. Besides, "'S use of kickin'? If you don't like it, you can walk out!"

The night-watchman is going home, and an old attendant from the Grand Central. "Tired, Pop?" "Yeh, p'tty tired." "What right 've you to git tired workin' for a big corporation?" The oppressed wage-slave bellows, "Ha, ha."

IV

Of these things Fifth Avenue is innocent at five in the afternoon. The diastole of travelers had spread all morning from Grand Central, the systole is active at five. As the great muscle contracts in the afternoon, atoms are pulled frantically to the suburbs, tearing their way through the weaker streams that are drawn up by the neighboring shops and clubs and bars and hotels. The Biltmore and Sherry's and Delmonico's and the Manhattan and the Belmont are no longer columnar monuments, holding secret vigil. They are secondary to the human floods which they suck in and spray out. The street itself is lost to memory and vision. A swollen stream, dammed at moments while Chosen People are permitted to walk dry-shod across, bears on its restless bosom the freight of curiosity and pride and favor. One might fancy, to gaze on this mad throng of motors, that a new religious sect had conquered the universe, worshippers of a machine.

It is the hour of white gloves and delicate profiles, the feminine hour. A little later there will be more leaves than blossoms, the men coming from work giving a duller tone. But one is permitted to believe for this period that Fifth Avenue has a personality, parti-colored, decorative, flashing, frivolous, composed of many styles and many types. The working world intersects it rudely at 42nd St., but scarcely infiltrates it. A qualification distinguishes those who turn up and down the Avenue. It is not leisure that distinguishes them, or money, but their sense that there is romance in the appearance of money and leisure. Many of the white gloves are cotton. Many of the gloves are not white. But it is May-time, the afternoon, Fifth Avenue. One may pretend the world is gay.

They seem chaotic and impulsive, these crowds on Fifth Avenue. They move as by personal will. But dawn and sunset, morning and evening, common attractions govern them. There is a rhythm in these human tides.

V

For eighty years Henri Fabre watched the insects. He stayed with his friend the spider the round of the clock. Time, that reveals the spider, is also eloquent of man in his city. Time is the scene-shifter and the detective. Some day we should pitch a metropolitan observatory at the corner of Fifth Avenue and 42nd St.,—some day, if we can find the time. F. H.

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Industrial Apostasy

IF you ask the cloak manufacturers of New York City what induced them, as humane men, to lock out sixty thousand employees and deprive sixty thousand poor families of their livelihood, they will answer you with an abundance of cogent reasons, considerations of prudence, and tales of grievances. They will tell you that the union, though pledged to do so, has been unwilling or unable to prevent incessant shop strikes which are the plague of the industry. They will assure you that the union intended to strike at its own chosen time, and that the lockout was only a war of anticipation and prevention; and they will end by declaring that business conditions are intolerable unless the employer can escape from an irritating union interference. In such and such a case the union was unreasonable, in another case tyrannical, in still another case foolish and obstructive. Therefore the manufacturers, as they themselves believe, are at last taking a stand for the independence of the employer, for that blessed peace in which the "boss" really bosses.

Worn, faded, and unreal as these protestations seem, they are at least not wholly hypocritical. The manufacturers, I believe, have no deep, ulterior motive. They do not wish to injure anybody in particular. They do not desire to reëstablish the conditions existing before the Protocol, the sweat-shop, the fire-trap, and the cruel over-working of men and girls in the shops. They are at least half conscious of what they believe to be an animating principle and are astounded, even outraged, at a popular disapproval which takes no account of what they believe to be their justifying motives. True, they do not reveal these motives and do not quite clearly grasp them themselves. Yet they feel that they are fighting, not for a reversion to the sweat-shop, but for an industrial freedom in which competition will be unhampered, the worker will gain his hire, the public will be excluded and peace will prevail.

It is all a delusion. The lockout is not a deliberate policy but a caprice. It is a matter of temperament. A certain group of manufacturers—not all—are doing what must be bad even for themselves, because they are irritated, are sick and tired and bored of doing what is good. Their present action is a debauch. But they are tired of being sober. They want their fling, even though they pay for it tomorrow. It is a reversion, an act of industrial apostasy, a return to the wild.

To understand the psychological basis of this lockout we must go back to the history of the industry, and grasp the determining conditions of the trade and its essential characteristics. The cloak industry is highly individualistic. It is individualistic because "wide-open" at the bottom. The little man can compete on fairly equal terms with the big. There is no monopoly element, no law of increasing returns, no decisive advantage in favor of the large shop. Because the little man can compete, the most individualistic people, adventurers with little capital and much energy, force their way in. They borrow a few hundred dollars, rent a loft, hire machines and engage a few green hands, their own *Landsleute*. It is a case of swim or sink, win or lose, and the battle is not to the virtuous but to the shrewd and bold.

The industry is individualistic also because Jews control it and Jews control it because it is individualistic. No people has a more elastic standard of living; none is more willing to live on little or so anxious to make much. The nervous, febrile energy of the Jew attracts him to this industry and makes him successful. It intensifies the competitive element. It disrupts organization. It is a constantly disintegrating element within the Association of Manufacturers, as also within the union. The struggle in the industry tends constantly to become a clash between competitors, between rival manufacturers, between rival groups of workers, rather than a class struggle between two class-conscious groups. One misses in the conferences between employers and employees the harsh mental contrasts to be found in other trades, for employers and workmen are of one race, many employers are wage-earners once removed and many wage-earners manufacturers-to-be, with a secret resolve not to "spoil their addition." It is difficult to secure group action, for manufacturers and wage-earners are alike individualistic, "on their own," seeing in each comrade the perpetual competitor, and in each enemy a possible ally. All is mobile, fluctuating, transient, and out of these economic and race-psychological conditions there arises a competition excessive and insane.

The result has always been a tendency towards a perpetually unstable equilibrium. The evils of the system were much more obvious in the years preceding the adoption of the Protocol in 1910. The new-fledged little manufacturers who entered the trade each year, the aggressive, humble yet bold interlopers who staked all they had on the enterprise and feverishly over-worked themselves,

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their families and their green employees set conditions for the whole industry. Their competition had to be met. It was a competition based on the art of getting much for little. The little manufacturers paid lower wages and lower rents and lived themselves on a proletarian scale. As they grew richer, less intense and more self-indulgent, and moved into better quarters and paid higher wages, they were forced in turn to meet the competition of new industrial parvenus. The industry was like America itself; intense, brutally competitive, with small beginnings and most spectacular endings.

But for the Protocol this condition would never have changed. Individualism threatened always to swallow up the corporate interest; the house tended always to fall apart. No cohesion was possible until the Protocol created conditions which protected the established manufacturers and the workers with a standard from the worst excesses of an unregulated and unhealthy competition. The Protocol was an industrial constitution establishing certain customs, rights, and traditions. It did not mean complete peace. It did not stop all warfare. Its great virtue was that it brought into a certain community of effort those manufacturers and workers who recognized amid their divisions that the welfare of both groups depended upon regulation and order. The conviction spread that the industry could prosper only if a manufacturers' association curbed the excessive individualism of the employers, and a union curbed the excessive individualism of the worker. The Protocol created a harmony between these groups. Organized manufacturers and organized wage-earners—though forever and necessarily at odds—were not enemies but allies. They were working for a common end, the organization of the industry. They had a common enemy—an excessive individualism, economic and racial.

Of course the Protocol did not end friction. It was a discipline, a supreme effort at self-control, an irksome alternative to internal strife and dissolution. Even with wise and high-minded men on both sides, squabbling, playing for small advantages, theoretical, interminable, ultra-logical discussions were inevitable. Some grievances could not be adjusted; much dissatisfaction remained. On the whole, however, the Protocol while it lasted was successful. It protected the fair employer from his less scrupulous competitor. It also protected the worker.

You cannot, however, change men over night. There were employers and workers who thirsted after the old destructive, anarchical freedom. They hated the restraints of a corporate organization; they despised the formality and pacifism of the Protocol, which forbade strikes and lockouts, and led to so much wearisome discussion. These inveterate, unreconstructed individualists on both sides, though hating each other, played into each other's hands.

The lock-out to-day proves merely that the old struggle is repeating itself. It is once more the conflict between individualists who hate the slow processes of industrial government and want the right to "go it alone," and the men with a wider outlook, who recognize that the industry cannot maintain itself under the anarchical conditions which such a system would produce. But this conflict, so largely one of temperament, translates itself into a struggle between employers and employees. For the patient, far-seeing men who once controlled the Manufacturers' Association have been put aside and the organization has fallen into the hands of the individualists. The union, on the other hand, is officially standing on the principle of mediation, arbitration and of joint legislation for the industry.

It is no wonder that public sentiment has turned in this struggle against the manufacturers. For the manufacturers have not only repelled all efforts at conciliation, but are obviously adopting an impossible program. The lockout, whether successful or not, cannot in the long run achieve the destruction of the union, for joint control of the industry is in the end as important to the manufacturers as to the workers. The public does not want all experiments in industrial government broken down. It does not want a disturbing war between sixty thousand workers and an organization of employers. It cannot permit the Manufacturers' Association to commit suicide, even in self-defense.

WALTER E. WEYL.

The Great Primary Humbug

WHEN I was a lad in school, the political fad was mugwumpery, an almost forgotten name. A mugwump was an independent, but that was not all of him. What distinguished him was his scorn of party allegiance. He would have nothing to do with parties. His weapon was the ballot alone, and with this, like a boy with a wooden sword, he went about to slap the dragons and ogres of Bossism.

Mugwumpery has passed and the reigning novelty is the primary—the "direct primary." Although there is an inherent antagonism between these two methods of political action—since the primary admits only party members—the purpose is the same, to finish the bosses. Singularly enough,

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the primary has eliminated the good in bossism and has preserved the evil. So it is with those who would win the Celestial City without climbing the Hill Difficulty.

In a representative government, the great matter is the selection of public officers, since it is by them that public policies must be effected. The engine of democracy is the election. The engine of party is the ticket. And the greatest of these is ticket. The problem is, then, how to make the ticket. The mugwump overlooked this. He was content to choose between tickets. He was like a boy who, being unwilling to climb the tree, must take what apples the other boys throw down to him. The primary avoids this blunder, it goes for the ticket; it climbs the tree, but somehow or other it gets the worst apples of all.

The most obvious vice of the primary is that it idolizes regularity. A true observation of the mugwump was that undeviating fidelity to party cemented the power of the boss. But, before the day of the primary, strict regularity, as a title to party standing, was no more than the cheap boast of the cheap candidate. Practical politicians thought nothing of it and no man who was willing to be serviceable to his party found his services rejected for lack of it. Men of genuine independence were active party members, striving to make the party organization an instrument of public service, resolving doubtful points in favor of the ticket but "scratching" when needful. Without this, party organizations would sink into contempt. Were the surrender of this measure of independence requisite for party membership, the party must lose all men of character and intelligence and pass altogether into the hands of men who are willing to make that surrender, whether from stupidity or avarice.

Bossism never dared to propose anything so vicious as this. But the primary does. Under its rule, the party member must be strictly "regular." He cannot become a candidate unless he voted the ticket at the last election, he cannot sign a nominating petition or vote in the primary save on the same condition. So enlightened a program as, for example, the nomination of the same candidate—perhaps a judge who has served long and honorably on the bench—by two parties cannot be adopted. I do not know if these be inherent and ineradicable vices in the primary system, but they are found in the system as I know it. The party is legalized and petrified, so to speak. It has lost that elasticity which was the result of its voluntary, extra-legal character, it can no longer meet special occasions with special measures, it has become fixed and immutable.

But the fundamental and ineradicable vice in the direct primary is that it tends to eliminate leadership, a tendency fatal to every human endeavor. If there are persons who think it either possible or desirable that average judgment should be automatically translated into government, I am not one of them. I have in mind a world where the stronger men lead the weaker men. This is the world we live in. It has always been so and, happily, will always be so; and a political system which ignores the fact is bound to fail.

The opposition to the nominating convention rests upon the belief that the delegates were mere puppets whose motions the boss controlled. This was too often true. It was always true that the convention responded to the leadership of the stronger men in the party organization. This was inevitable and it was right. The result depended upon the quality of that leadership. It was often bad, but that was not the fault of the method.

The champions of the primary insisted that it was the fault of method; that since the boss controlled the convention, the convention must go. They did not pause to ask why the boss controlled the convention. They assumed that he controlled it by virtue of some trick and so cheated the party members of their legitimate authority. They proposed a plan for restoring that authority. They forgot that the convention was itself founded upon a primary. The control of the convention by a boss was not in the main the result of corruption or trickery, but of his influence over party members, who voted in the primary for his ticket of delegates. Anyone at all familiar with the mechanism of American politics—particularly municipal politics, where the boss has flourished—will recognize the fidelity of this picture. He will remember the invincible strength of the headquarters slate, how the word was sent down the line, with what loyalty the boys responded to the nod of the chief, how like autumn leaves their ballots covered the inanimate forms of those babes-in-the-wood, the anti-machine candidates.

This was not corruption; it was loyalty. Doubtless there was sometimes corruption. With some there were expectations of good things to come from the hand of the chief, places on the "force," and elsewhere; but in the main it was just the good old game of follow your leader. And this game is played with the same zest in the new primary as in the old. The slate goes through with the same lubricity. The theory was that by this new method the people, whose voice is the voice of God, would make the ticket and make it right. The fact is they make it neither under the new system nor under the old. Under the one they voted for the headquarters slate of delegates, under the other for the headquarters slate of candidates.

The difference is that the boss has his way more completely under the new system. There were al-

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ways some men of principle and strength—few, perhaps, but some—who found their way into every party convention and insisted on having something to say about the ticket. I have seen more than one ticket saved from mediocrity, or worse, by the influence of such men. I have seen the public interest served more effectually by two or three such men, during one evening in a committee room, enveloped in a cloud of cigar smoke and elbow to elbow with the most practical of politicians, than by all the smug mugwumps in the vicinage throughout the year.

What has become of these men under the régime of the primary? They have no desire to hold office; they can, it is true, vote in the primary if sufficiently "regular," and they may if "regular" join in petitions and thus bring into the field candidates for places on the ticket, to be mowed down by the slate. But their contact with the boss, both in and out of conventions, is gone, and with it their influence.

This lowers the quality of the ticket. But the evil does not stop there. Not only does the ticket avoid the fit candidate but the fit candidate avoids the ticket. It has never been easy to get fit men to run for office. Under the primary system it is vastly harder than it was before. Under the convention system such a man, when agreed upon by those in control, could be approached and urged to make the race; he could be told who would be his associates on the ticket, he could know upon what platform the candidates would stand, he could count upon an organized party support, he could make the race at an expense which was within his means, whether large or small. Under the primary system he must make two races; the cost of the first must be defrayed from his own purse; he must make a personal canvass for the nomination, a thing particularly distasteful to men of good ability because, where there is no division by parties, there can be little or no discussion of political principles but only the altercations of personal rivalry; he cannot know who will be his associates on the ticket; usually he cannot know what declaration of principles he will be asked to support, because the practise under the primary system is to postpone the platform convention until after the primary, upon the theory that the nominees should write the platform. Under this scheme, it is the most difficult thing in the world to get good men to stand for office and the field is almost wholly abandoned to those who seek office for selfish purpose.

It will doubtless be objected that I take too favorable a view of the convention system, that I have drawn a fancy picture of the boss in the arms of the patriot. I think not. What is a boss? Sometimes a single, strong man, often the leader of a group of strong men, men of genuine vigor of mind and will, finding their advantage in controlling elections, and willing to take the infinite pains required for it; not always good, perhaps not usually good, but susceptible to the influence of good men who are also strong men, men willing to meet them on their own ground, willing to concede something and to leave a stern and uncompromising censoriousness to the parlor patriots.

There is nothing automatic about democracy. It requires infinite pains and entails infinite vexations. Who will take those pains and bear those vexations? First of all, men who find their advantage in it, the professionals of politics. After them, a few men with a strong sense of public duty and, perhaps, a touch of fondness for the game, the amateurs of politics. These were the leaven of the political lump and them the primary has rejected.

LAFON ALLEN.

CORRESPONDENCE

What Jung Has Done

SIR: Mr. Walter Lippmann's review of Dr. Jung's book "Psychology of the Unconscious," may be excellent criticism from the Freudian viewpoint, but since doubtless many readers of THE NEW REPUBLIC are not aware of the fact that the psychoanalytic movement is divided into two schools, headed by Freud and Jung, there is an element of injustice in the attack. Mr. Lippmann takes the Freudian stand, with the usual arguments. Jung's book, he says, "is a personal adventure in search of a philosophy, far more than a contribution to psychoanalytic understanding." Jung "has introduced into the empirical labors and tentative inductions of Freud a series of grandiose generalizations about human destiny." I am merely surprised that Mr. Lippmann has omitted the most damning word of all, namely, "mysticism." Had he used it, the Freudian case against Jung would be complete.

However, no criticism that Mr. Lippmann has brought against the book equals in severity what Dr. Jung himself says in his author's note:

> My task in this work has been to investigate an individual phantasy system, and in the doing of it problems of such magnitude have been uncovered, that my endeavor to grasp them in their entirety has necessarily meant only a superficial orientation toward those paths, the opening and exploration of which may possibly crown the work of future investigators with success. . . . I am not in sympathy with the attitude which favors the repression of certain possible working hypotheses because they are perhaps erroneous, and so may possess no lasting value. Certainly I endeavored as far as possible to guard myself against error, which might indeed become especially dangerous upon these dizzy heights, for I am entirely aware of the risks of these investigations. However, I do not consider scientific work as a dogmatic contest, but rather as a work done for the increase and deepening of knowledge.
>
> This contribution is addressed to those having similar ideas concerning science.

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This note, I feel, is in itself an excellent answer to dogmatic critics: it breathes the very spirit of the scientist, who speaks of his profound labor as "only a superficial orientation," and the risks of laboring on "these dizzy heights." In short, he offers his work tentatively, and for what can be found in it.

As a matter of fact, however, to those who are not dogmatic and personal adherents of Freud the contribution of Jung is of revolutionary importance. For instance, G. Stanley Hall has given it as his opinion that this book is without doubt the most important contribution in the whole realm of psychoanalytic literature.

To my mind, the school of Jung bears the same relationship to the school of Freud, as, say, the political school of which, roughly speaking, Mr. Lippmann himself is a member, bears to the school of Marxian Socialism. Marx reduced the world to economic determinism: Mr. Lippmann in his books recognizes the economic but sees it merely as a part of the complexity. So Freud, roughly speaking, reduces the world to sexuality and Jung is forced to see in sexuality merely one aspect of the "libido."

However, this alone might not outrage the Freudians: what shocks them so is that Jung carries psychoanalysis to its inevitable conclusion. The term psychoanalysis itself plainly enough denotes the probing and investigating of mind: and since the subjective realm of man includes not only the personal, but also the racial, since in it are found strivings and phantasies and impulses which have had their expression in myths and religious systems, it is inevitable that the religious problem must be dealt with. At this point Jung and Freud part company altogether.

For Jung finds that the modern problem of the individual is essentially the same as the ancient problem, and that the great religions arose out of supreme needs of the race. There is need for more than a theory which includes "a reduction to the primitive" and a "sublimation" in work: there is need of an inner change, a struggle by which the individual is enabled to overcome infantilism and human weaknesses in order to meet the task of life.

It is impossible in so short a space as this to give any conception of the profundity and strength of Jung's work in this direction. If, however, Dr. Hinkle's remarkable introduction to the book (which by the way Mr. Lippmann omits to mention) is read before the book itself is read, a very clear idea of Dr. Jung's contribution will be gained. The book itself, of course, will prove its own answer to the critics. They greet it to-day exactly in the spirit that Freud's work was first greeted, and though these critics have now caught up with Freud they still lag far behind Jung. Yet it is my conviction that Jung has added to the knowledge of life a contribution which will necessitate a deep change in the thinking and attitude of the race.

JAMES OPPENHEIM.

New York City.

[NOTE: To say that "Freud, roughly speaking, reduces the world to sexuality" is to speak a little too roughly. It is to misunderstand. This is the only point on which I should care to quarrel with Mr. Oppenheim. The rest of his letter I accept as eloquent testimony to the fairness of my assertion about Jung and his disciples—that they have found a religion. The process they have gone through is such an old story that they ought to recognize it. It is the process by which a bit of truth seems so marvelous that it is made to embrace the universe. The Pythagoreans did it with numbers, and many did it with the Ptolemaic astronomy, and Tennyson did it most hideously with a mistaken notion of evolution.—W. L.]

Why We Cannot Arbitrate

SIR: Your "appeal to the President" contains such a fallacious argument and one so frequently uttered in these days that I ask leave to call it to your readers' attention.

The main premise of your article is that neutrals should join together to oppose aggressors and you define the aggressors to be "the Power which refuses to submit its quarrel to international inquiry." You then state we have reached a crisis in our relations with Germany over the submarine question, and your conclusion is to advise the President not to stop at a suspension of diplomatic relations but to at once join the Allies.

Do you not see the illogicality of such an argument? If you want us to join the Allies totally apart from the submarine question, come out and say so frankly. But to advise us to join the Allies because of the submarine question is flying in the face of the principle underlying your whole argument; because if we did so we would be acting the part of the aggressor, we would be doing the very thing to which we have already assumed that we are fundamentally opposed. For Germany has twice already offered to leave certain aspects of the submarine question to arbitration and unless we not only are willing but even urge Germany to leave the whole question to the Hague Tribunal, will we not be the aggressor, will we not be "the Power which refuses to submit its quarrel to international inquiry?"

I confess your argument, heard on every hand, strikes me with bewilderment. The chief American criticism of the Central Powers at the outset of the war was their refusal to leave their quarrel to an impartial tribunal before beginning to fight. Yet here we ourselves have a quarrel, one susceptible of settlement by a tribunal if ever one was, one of a truly justiciable nature, and what occurs?

Attempts of Bryan to urge arbitration are laughed at, and non-partisan thoughtful moulders of public thought like yourselves urge immediate war in the selfsame article in which you swear devotion to the principle of arbitration!

I don't like to be insulting, but I think it would be hard to find an equal to your editorial without going to the astounding fulminations of the German yellow press in which the lengths to which deep feeling can lead sober reason are most sadly illustrated.

If this criticism does you an injustice, I hope you will point it out.

EUSTACE SELIGMAN.

New York City.

[NOTE: Mr. Seligman's notion of arbitration is like that of a man who should say that the police must not arrest a murderer until a court has passed on his guilt, and that in the interim he must be left at large to continue murdering. On his theory, the police are the "aggressors"—on the same theory, Belgium was the aggressor because it resisted Germany, instead of allowing Germany to invade her and then submitting the case to arbitration. Mr. Seligman's effort to impale us in a dilemma merely reveals a perfectly meaningless conception of what arbitration is. For our part we deliberately avoided the word arbitration and spoke of "inquiry." But even inquiry cannot be practised while irreparable injury is being done. The nation which does not suspend the commission of such injuries until orderly processes have supervened is clearly the aggressor.—THE EDITORS.]

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What Led Up to the War

The Diplomacy of the Great War, by Arthur Bullard. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.50.

A GOOD book is often ruined by a bad title. This book by Arthur Bullard risks such fate. Offhand, the title seems to imply a discussion of the Blue and Green and Orange papers. It implies, at any rate, that Mr. Bullard explores the activities of the diplomats in relation to this war. The general public knows what to do with such a book. It will fight shy of it. Diplomacy was a sorry spectacle at the outbreak of the war, and the public is bored with its confused memory of it. A small class may go deeper. It may read Mr. Bullard in the hope of a new and special examination. But this class will in turn be disappointed. Mr. Bullard's book is neither an account nor an exploration of the diplomacy of the great war.

What has happened in Europe since 1878? That is the sole subject of the first part of this book. It is a general and deliberately elementary survey of international relations since the Congress of Berlin. Once a man is orientated on this subject a recapitulation like Mr. Bullard's can hardly be worth his while. But it is not everyone who has found his bearings in European politics. It is not everyone who is even broadly informed as to the internal and external conflicts and compromises that preceded this war. The Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation, the Dreyfus affair, the Bagdad railroad enterprise, the Algeciras crisis, to go no further, are by no means matters of universal knowledge. Back of Mr. Bullard's inadequate title, then, there is this general survey. It is the first admirable feature of a valuable book.

If a man is orientated on any subject he expects a new book to make a "contribution." He expects an author, that is to say, to carry on the discussion beyond the points he has already grasped. This is a fair criterion to apply to authors frankly "editorial" in intention. But it is no criticism of a survey to say it would be commonplace to some readers. And a virtue of Mr. Bullard's survey is that he handles document and chronicle in a spirit notably fresh and sincere.

There is a great deal of portentous pose about most international commentators. They handle state affairs in public as solemnly as undertakers handle coffins—in public. They try to live up to the be-medalled diplomacy in the mysterious fashion in which they whisper about the quai d'Orsay. Without treating diplomacy as tragi-comic Mr. Bullard writes of it in a manner peculiarly straightforward and simple. He does not affect to be a Yankee at the effete courts of Europe, but he gets at the essence of the issues involved, a candid "man from home." He does not dwell on purely formal diplomacy. He accounts in full and well related detail, for nationalistic, economic and imperial considerations. There may be more expert accounts of European relations from 1878 to 1914. It would be hard to find one more lucidly informative, vivid and concise.

Mr. Bullard's own opinion on this period of European evolution is formulated as follows: "Most European history of the last thirty years could be compressed into two statements:

"The non-Germanic peoples felt that it was not only their right, but their most sacred duty to resist the encroachments of the Deutschtum.

"The Germans could not conceive how any but idiots and perverts could resist the realization of their beneficent and reforming mission."

This quotation may suggest bias. It is an inference, however, not a thesis. And Mr. Bullard is as frank about English, French and American misdemeanors as he is about the German misdemeanor of bullying and mystic conceit.

In the last three sections of his book Mr. Bullard discusses the newer elements in diplomacy, the way they may affect the decision when war is concluded, and our own policy in a world where international issues can be violently joined.

This part of the book is, in a sense, Mr. Bullard's contribution. It is an attempt to show the driving forces behind modern capitalistic states and empires and to plead the advantages of a more democratic control of foreign affairs. So far as the analysis is concerned, it is suggestive. Mr. Bullard shows how strategical considerations, as well as economic and ethnological considerations, come in to complicate and even warp pacific aspiration. He quotes a German settler at Hong-Kong very illuminatingly as to the tactics employed by a rival empire, and he presents both sides of the argument for colonial expansion and control. How peace may be durable, rather than a brief international armistice, is discussed with reference to the possibility of German victory as well as Ally victory; and wise emphasis is laid on the part that public opinion and publicity will play.

The opinionative section of this book, especially in regard to our war policy, is built on unstable foundations. Events have shifted too quickly to leave it four-square. But a spirit like Mr. Bullard's, one so patient with diplomats while critical of diplomacies, works valuably even with insufficient data. And his shrewdness about peace advocates, especially "peace—with victory" advocates, is not the least fine quality in a book that exhibits fine and enduring qualities throughout.

F. H.

Shade and Sun

Dead Souls, by Nikolai Gogol. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co. $1.25 net.

NOT all Russians are saturated with an immense and passionate pessimism. Neither are all Russian novels depressing. To realize this it is only necessary to read "Dead Souls," which as Mr. Stephen Graham emphasizes in his introduction, is the most characteristically national novel of them all. Gogol was born in the beautiful frontier country of Ukraine—Little Russia. His early years were watched over by a grandfather profoundly interested in the traditional literature of his race. From the high school of Poltava, Gogol in 1829, at the age of twenty, went to St. Petersburg to look for work. At first he tried to go on the stage, but the director of the imperial theaters promptly decided that Gogol was no actor. Then he fell in love with a youthful widow, who failed to give him any encouragement. On the point of setting out for abroad, he made the melancholy discovery that he had not enough money to pay the expenses of his projected journey, and was forced to return to the capital. After a period of privations he obtained a small government clerkship, where he had an ample opportunity to observe officialdom from the inside. This post, however, he soon threw up in disgust, and began to take pupils. But the pupils did not continue to come.

The tide turned in 1831, with the publication of "Eve-

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nings in a Farmhouse on the Dikanka," which delicately and exquisitely evoked the spirit of his beloved Little Russia and displayed his wonderful descriptive powers. This book brought him the powerful friendship of Pushkin and of the distinguished scholar, Jukovsky, who translated Homer into Russian. Next year followed a second series of Evenings, entitled "Stories of Mirgorod." Meantime, through his two influential friends, Gogol had been appointed to the professorship of history at the University of St. Petersburg, a post for which, on his own admission, he was but ill equipped. He began by planning to write a history of the world, then—the large design falling through—a history of the Ukraine. Finally he turned aside to investigating the more inviting subject of the folk-songs of Little Russia. In this piece of research he found the inspiration for his great historical novel "Taras Bulba" (1834), Homeric in its grandeur and simplicity.

Success at last visited Gogol. Through his scathing comedy, "The Inspector General," he made many bureaucratic enemies. He gained one powerful and faithful friend, the Emperor Nicholas. He was now famous and was soon to be wealthy.

For some time Gogol had cherished the design of writing a long novel which should express the soul of Russia. In 1842 was published the first of the three contemplated parts of this book, "Dead Souls." Although in 1845, in a sudden accession of despair, he burned all of Part Two that was already written, he continued fitfully at his task until his death. Before he died he had twice burned the finished work. His ambition in the later portions of the story was, in the words of Mr. Maurice Baring, "to work out the moral regeneration of Tchitchikoff, the hero, and in doing so to attain a full and complete expression of his ideals and his outlook on life." This he was fated never to accomplish, and the realization that his dearest purpose remained unfulfilled sadly embittered the closing years of his life.

Pushkin it was who gave Gogol the subject of his greatest novel. One day he reminded Gogol that Cervantes could never have attained his distinguished position in Spanish literature on the strength of the Novelas Ezemplares alone, and thereupon urged the author of the "Evenings" and "Stories" to write a long novel upon a subject about which he himself had thought of writing a poem.

Tchitchikoff, the protagonist, thinks he has discovered a royal road to wealth. Before the Emancipation of 1861 the Revisions or Censuses of slaves ("souls") were held at very irregular and infrequent intervals. When a slave died his name remained on his owner's register, and capitation tax had to be paid for the "dead soul" until a new Census removed his name from the list. Tchitchikoff resolved to possess himself of as much fictitious property in dead souls as possible by inducing slave-owners to sign over to him on official forms the names of dead slaves, and then to realize a loan from a bank in one of the great cities upon this documentary collateral from the provinces. Of course, when a "dead soul" was transferred to him he relieved the owner from the obligation of paying poll-tax. He was even willing in obdurate cases to pay a few roubles per dead soul in order to overcome the scruples some owners entertained about selling property which was really no property.

With varying success Tchitchikoff prosecuted his extraordinary quest across Russia. "Dead Souls" is the story of his vicissitudinous progress. The picaresque plan of the book gave Gogol a free hand and enabled him to introduce representatives of almost every type of Russian humanity. There is the suspicious Madame Korobotchinka, "widow of a collegiate secretary," and Tchitchikoff's hostess of a night, who scents in him a possible customer for her honey, and in her anxiety to propitiate him, extends "the height of hospitality." "Well, now your bed is ready," she said. . . . "Do you need anything more? Perhaps, father, you are accustomed to have some one to tickle your heels at night. My late husband could never get to sleep without it." But the guest declined to have his heels tickled. The subsequent haggling between Tchitchikoff and his hostess over her dead souls is one of the most amusing scenes in the book. Then there is Maniloff—a delightful donkey, with a dash of Pecksniff in him—the nostrils of whose prodigious son Themistoclus, ambassador in embryo (it was Maniloff's pleasure thus to spell his name), exacted the attention of a special footman. Particularly funny is the scene between the dealer in the dead and Nozdreff (Jingle without the staccato). Tchitchikoff has introduced the subject nearest to his heart, the purchase of Nozdreff's dead souls, when Nozdreff abruptly turns the tables by earnestly offering his stallion for sale and—that refused—in rapid succession a chestnut mare, a couple of terrific Brudastayas (hunting dogs)—"their hair stands up like bristles; the curves of their loins are something inconceivable"—and a hand-organ!

"Dead Souls" is full of humanity and good-nature. It is the work of a man who is at once a great satirist and a great humorist. Throughout its pages we are close to the great heart of Russia. Turgeniev, Tolstoi, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Tchekov give us phases of Russia and the Russian. All of them learned a great deal from their predecessor, the author of "Dead Souls." It is Gogol, most of all, who gives us universal Russia.

H. A. L.

Rights of Aliens

The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims, by Edwin M. Borchard, LL.B., Ph.D., Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State. New York: The Banks Law Publishing Co. $9.00.

THE right of a state to extend diplomatic protection to its citizens abroad is, of course, but the obverse of the right of the citizen to claim certain treatment at the hands of any state wherein he may be an alien. In other words, international law to-day limits the sovereignty of the state with respect to aliens within its borders. To what extent? On what grounds? What is the mode and measure of redress when a state violates the precepts of international law applicable to these matters? And who are aliens and who citizens? These are the subjects which Mr. Borchard discusses with thoroughness, learning and lucidity.

The position of the alien in early Rome is sufficiently indicated by the fact that in the Twelve Tables alien and enemy were indifferently designated *hostis*. But the necessities of commerce called the *jus gentium* into being, and in 242 B. C. the first *Praetor Peregrinus* was appointed. Under the empire the gap between citizen and alien was gradually closed, though it was not till Caracalla's day that the development of ages was completed by the famous edict which made all freemen of the empire Romans.

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The position of the alien in the middle ages presents an interesting paradox. The connection existing in the feudal state between sovereignty and land-holding furnished the germ of the modern territorial state and gave the lord of the manor extensive control over those domiciled on his domains, which, however, was limited by wont and use. But the stranger could not plead these and so was left exposed to such exactions as the territorial sovereign chose to make. On the other hand, through the lingering influence of the ancient Germanic view of the law as a personal attribute, rather than a regional sway, the alien—and especially the alien merchant—was apt to be admitted into a state on terms that rendered him and his group a sort of *imperium in imperio* with its own private jurisprudence, a condition that has survived in the Ottoman Empire till the other day through the Capitulations. (See P. M. Brown's "Foreigners in Turkey.")

The founder of the law of nations approached the subject of the rights of aliens with the theological necessity in mind of justifying the narrative in Numbers, XXI, 21 ffg., where the king of the Amorites is punished for opposing the passage of the Children of Israel through his domains. Upon this text Grotius developed the doctrine of "the right of harmless use," whence he deduced the duty of the sovereign to permit the temporary residence of strangers, the transit of foreign merchants, the erection of temporary structures, and immigration into unsettled territories. Furthermore, where rights of this sort were conceded to aliens—at least so the followers of Grotius interpreted him as saying—they must be conceded to all equally. (Thomas Baty, International Law, pages 27-8).

But these rather weakly grounded speculations, have, after all, influenced the modern law of nations very little, from which indeed they have been cut off by the rise of the dogmas of positive jurisprudence, and especially the principle of state sovereignty. The present-day position of the alien must therefore be traced to a different origin, namely the commercial treaty, which wears the *prima facie* appearance at least of an unconstrained act of grace. In point of fact, however, the increasing demands of commerce and, more recently, of investment capital seeking opportunity in the undeveloped regions of the world, have, through the operation of the principle of reciprocity, left even the most powerful and prosperous of states very little choice in the matter, with the result that alien privilege has taken on in the past century and a half ever new dimensions. Our own treaty-making in this field is but illustrative of the general rule. Compare for instance the Jay Treaty of 1794 with the Japanese Treaty of a century later. The former agreement accorded British subjects the right to resort to the "lands, countries, cities, ports, places, and rivers" of the United States and "to remain there without any limitation of time," but for *purposes of trade merely,* and "subject always . . . to the laws and statutes" of the United States. The latter treaty, now defunct, extended to Japanese subjects "full liberty to enter, travel, or reside" in any part of the United States without limitation as to object; assured them "full and perfect protection of their persons and property," and "all the rights and privileges enjoyed by" American citizens in connection with the administration of justice; and guaranteed them further "in whatever relates to rights of residence and travel," and the possession, use and transmission of property, "the same privileges, liberties and rights" of citizens and subjects of the most favored nation. (See the reviewer's "National Supremacy," pages 86-91 and 216-27).

But it is not only the pressure of commerce and capital that accounts for this evolution. For this connotes also those great formative ideas which lay at the basis of the French Revolution: the idea of the rights of man and the idea of nationality. The alien, being a man, is entitled to the rights of man. The alien being a citizen of his own state, that state is privileged to intervene if necessary, to secure from other states the recognition and protection of those rights. As Mr. Borchard puts it, and on the whole justly: "It was only with the French Revolution, which emphasized the rights of the individual, both at home and abroad, that a definite practise arose of extending diplomatic protection to citizens abroad" (page 6). At some other points, however, Mr. Borchard rather overemphasizes the importance of the doctrine of the rights of man as the source of alien rights, with the result of involving himself in contradiction. Thus on page 32 he writes that "diplomatic protection . . . conforms with the aim of international organization—the advancement and protection of those rights" which are recognized "as inherent in the individual." But he has already stated that resort to the diplomatic remedy "is solely a right of government, the justification and expediency of its employment being a matter for the government's unrestricted discretion," (page vi). No doubt the gap thus disclosed between the state's right to consult what is expedient for itself and the right which, on Mr. Borchard's theory is morally claimable from the state by its citizens abroad, could be somewhat abridged by a better international machinery for the determination of private claims, but it is hardly conceivable that it would entirely disappear.

Coming, then, to the position of the alien to-day, two questions may be posed: 1st, To what extent may a state

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exclude aliens? 2d, What sort of treatment must it accord those whom it admits? The answer returned to the former question by British and American authorities asserts the state's prerogative to the fullest extent. But continental writers, on the contrary, basing their argument upon an alleged right of international intercourse, reject this rule, and, as Mr. Borchard shows, practise does not sustain it. If, therefore, the state has theoretically the right to exclude foreigners simply because they are foreigners, it is at least a right exceedingly difficult to enforce. As Professor Baty writes: "Nations condescend to all kinds of sanitary, educational, and racial tests to avoid the imputation of excluding individuals of a particular country. . . . Discrimination against a particular state, even as a matter of bargaining, would be deeply resented" ("International Law," page 26). On the other hand, a nation that chose to exclude all foreigners would cut itself off from international intercourse.

The second of the above questions is therefore the really important one. Fortunately, there is no fundamental dispute as to the general answer to be returned to it: international law to-day recognizes that there is a certain minimum of rights due the alien which the state cannot reduce or avoid by provisions of the municipal law, nor even by the fact that it may itself violate the rights of its own citizens; and also there is a maximum limit of control by the state over aliens within its borders which the state cannot exceed without violating the rights of other states (Borchard, pages 39, 43). Furthermore, the generalization may be ventured that the lines which determine the minimum and maximum just referred to, tend to approach one another and to coincide with the line which divides the political rights and duties of the citizen from the personal rights which the citizen and alien share more and more equally. Obviously, the judicial interpretation of our own Constitution, since the Fourteenth amendment was added to it, confirms this generalization.

The fact is, as Mr. Borchard's pages abundantly attest, the question of the *substance* of alien rights is no longer an active one—the alien has established himself. Most of the cases that to-day arise demanding diplomatic intervention in behalf of the citizen abroad originate in countries, particularly the Latin-American states, whose laws place the alien and the citizen on a substantial equality so far as civil rights are concerned, but whose governmental machinery frequently breaks down when it comes to protecting these rights, not only in the case of the alien but of the citizen as well. Hence the famous doctrine to which the Argentinian jurist Calvo has given his name, and the essential clause of which runs as follows: "It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same right to protection as nationals but they ought not to lay claim to a protection more extended. If they suffer wrong, they ought to count on the government of the country prosecuting the delinquents, and not claim from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any pecunary indemnity" (Borchard, page 793). This doctrine is based upon the doctrine of the equal sovereignty of states and the proposition that diplomatic intervention is an infraction of sovereignty—as indeed it is, albeit an entirely allowable one. At any rate, the Calvo principle has been met and defeated at almost every turn by the doctrine of the capitalist states that a *denial of justice*—to be judged of in each instance by the intervening state—violates international law and so gives rise to the right of intervention. Only at one point has Calvo won a partial triumph, in the restriction placed by the Hague Convention of 1907 upon the use of military force in the collection of international contractual debts.

Time!

Arnold Bennett and Providence have endowed us all with twenty-four hours a day.

Carnegie and the lowest worker in his mines, Wanamaker and his youngest errand boy, Rockefeller and the garage workers who sell his gasoline—all have the same.

But until Ingersoll made the watch accessible to the millions only the *well-to-do* had time; poor people *guessed* at it—and continued poor.

The Man Behind the Counter

There are Ingersoll Watches for everyone: Little ones, big ones, watches to be carried in the pocket; to fit on the wrist; to stand on the desk or table; to go into ladies' hand bags; to be fastened beside the bed or the stove in the kitchen; the new "Radiolite" that tells time in the dark; in all twelve different sizes and kinds from the famous Dollar Watch to the new, thin, 7-Jeweled, accurate, bridge-model Reliance at $3.00.

And this concession, not insignificant in itself, may be earnest of yet more considerable developments to come, a possibility which enhances the importance of Mr. Borchard's labors. As the author himself writes in his concluding paragraph: Existing conditions afford reason for the hope "that international pecuniary claims arising out of injuries to citizens may gradually be removed from the arena of international controversy, with its dangers to the amicable relations of states, and be submitted to an international forum for judicial determination." When this day arrives Mr. Borchard's volume will be of vast service to the tribunal thus forshadowed and to those practising before it. Meantime, it will take its place among the volumes that are indispensable to the student of international law.

In one way the title of the volume is too broad, since it is the diplomatic protection of *American* citizens abroad with which it deals for the most part; and indeed a considerable proportion of the material used was already available in Professor Moore's great Digests. But the American material is admirably supplemented from the contributions of foreign writers, whose books and articles are listed in exhaustive bibliographies. Thus the extent to which the American rules are representative of international practise is frequently indicated. The only adverse criticism I would suggest of this accurate, painstaking, well arranged and well written work is that the author has sometimes failed to disentangle his principal conclusions from the detail of his discussion, and so they have to be hunted out at the cost of some labor. This is a fault that might have been easily avoided, and can be repaired in a later edition.

EDWARD S. CORWIN.

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